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Abstract
Recent contributions to the political economics literature (Trebbi et al. 2007; Aghion et
al. 2004) have challenged the view that political institutions are exogenous to the behavior
of agents in the political arena. We explicitly address the potential endogeneity of institu-
tions by examining the link between the degree of electoral competition and the design of
ballot access restrictions in the United States. Exploiting exogenous variation in electoral
competition at the state level induced by the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, our main
¯nding is that restrictions to the entry of minor party and independent candidates have been
systematically adjusted to changing degrees of electoral competition.
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Most of the literature on constitutional choice and electoral rules has treated politi-
cal institutions as exogenous constraints on policymakers. For instance, an in°uential
recent line of thinking comprising, among others, Rodrik (1999) and Persson and
Tabellini (2003) has discussed institutions as predetermined factors driving key eco-
nomic outcomes. Only very recently a positive approach to the choice of political
institutions has been suggested. It seeks to explain why di®erent societies have dif-
ferent political institutions, and tries to ¯gure out the determinants of institutional
change. The positive approach starts from the simple but intriguing idea that, after
all, political institutions are chosen by individuals and are not randomly assigned to
countries and societies. Alesina and Glaeser (2004), for instance, deal with the strate-
gic choice of electoral rules, focussing on the implications of alternative constitutional
choices on the welfare state. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) explain the extension
of voting rights in western societies as the outcome of strategic choices of political
elites to prevent social unrest. The tradeo® between delegation of power and ex-post
control of politicians is analyzed in Aghion et al. (2004). Finally, Trebbi et al. (2007)
report evidence that the choice of electoral rules in U.S. cities varies with the share of
minorities in a way that e®ectively limits minority representation.
Despite the fact that a re-design of political institutions by self-interested political
elites has potentially far-reaching consequences, there is little empirical evidence for
endogenous institutional change. This paper contributes to the literature by inves-
tigating the endogeneity of a particular institution, namely ballot access rules for
third-party and independent candidates in the United States. While in the U.S. major
party candidates are being determined by primary elections or caucuses, minor par-
ties and independent candidates commonly need to ¯le a petition signed by a certain
number of eligible voters.1 Recent empirical work shows that these requirements have
1Despite the fact that a majoritarian voting system as in the U.S. promotes the existence of
two dominating political parties (Duverger, 1964), third-party as well as independent candidates
frequently appear on ballots in state as well as federal elections. During the period considered
here (1946-1976), 46% of the gubernatorial races saw three or more candidates, while 50% had two
candidates and 4% were uncontested. In U.S. House elections, the corresponding numbers were 28%
2strong deterrent e®ects on third party and independent candidates: Ansolabehere and
Gerber (1996) ¯nd that higher ¯ling fees increase the frequency of uncontested races
and decrease the frequency of retirements in congressional elections. In the same vein,
Stratmann (2005) demonstrates that ¯ling fees deter third party candidates in state
level Lower House elections. Finally, Drometer and Rincke (2008) exploit the Supreme
Court decision of 1968 to strike down Ohio's highly restrictive ballot access law as a
natural experiment and ¯nd that the number of third party and independent candi-
dates increased considerably. Hence, choosing ballot access rules as an example of a
(potentially) endogenous institution is justi¯ed by the fact that a tightening of the
underlying state laws will have an immediate impact on the e®ective level of electoral
competition. As recently discussed by Besley et al. (2006), this may in turn have
strong e®ects on the quality of governance and thereby economic performance.
As a ¯rst step of the analysis, we set up a simple theoretical model which illustrates
the optimal choice of barriers to entry to the political arena from the point of view
of a self-interested incumbent political party. The incumbent party is assumed to
adjust the barrier to changes in exogenous conditions a®ecting the e®ective degree of
electoral competition. The model thus treats the e®ective degree of competition as an
endogenous variable which depends on exogenous conditions as well as the barrier set
by the incumbent party. In a second step, we investigate whether the design of ballot
access requirements in U.S. states is systematically related to the degree of competition
in gubernatorial elections. This exercise is complicated by the fact that the observable
degree of electoral competition already re°ects the deterrent e®ect of existing ballot
access requirements on potential third party and independent candidates: in states
with few such candidates, the major parties will face low competition even without any
ballot access requirement, while in states with many active political parties a similar
level of e®ective competition might be the outcome of more restrictive requirements.
Naive estimates relating the stringency of ballot access rules to observed levels of
electoral competition are therefore likely to be misleading.
Our strategy to solve the endogeneity problem exploits the federal Voting Rights Act
(three or more candidates), 59% (two candidates) and 13% (uncontested).
3(VRA) of 1965 as a natural experiment. Before the mid-1960s, politics in the southern
states2 was characterized by a quasi-monopoly of the Democratic Party and the prac-
tical disenfranchisement of most black voters. The VRA e®ectively removed barriers
to the political participation of blacks such as poll taxes and literacy tests and led
to a rapid and signi¯cant increase in registration rates among black voters: taking
all southern states together, registration among blacks jumped from 35.5% in 1964 to
64.8% in 1969.3 The increased political participation of black voters had a substantial
e®ect on the political supply side, i.e. on political parties and potential candidates
for public o±ce: while in all non-southern states the average number of candidates
in gubernatorial elections showed a moderate change from 2.6 in the years immedi-
ately before the VRA (1958-1964) to 2.9 in the period 1966-1972, the respective ¯gure
considerably increased from 2.1 to 2.8 in the southern states.
Our strategy to exploit the variation in electoral competition induced by the VRA pro-
ceeds in two steps. In the ¯rst step, we substantiate the claim that the VRA is a source
of exogenous variation in the number of candidates in gubernatorial elections, and that
this variation is strong enough to solve our identi¯cation problem. In particular, we
estimate the treatment e®ect of the VRA on the number of candidates in states with
a substantial black minority by a series of di®erence-in-di®erence estimations. The
main ¯nding across various speci¯cations and robustness checks is that the federal
intervention of 1965 indeed had a signi¯cant impact on the number of candidates. We
check this result against a number of alternative explanations for the increase in the
number of candidates in southern states. In particular, we show that the signi¯cant
increase in electoral competition cannot be explained by the gradual catch up of the
South in terms of educational attainment, income, and urbanization.
Our main result is established in the second step of the empirical analysis, where we
derive estimates of the impact of electoral competition on the stringency of ballot
access laws in terms of signature requirements for third-party and independent candi-
dates. To overcome the endogeneity problem, we construct an instrumental variable
2We use the de¯nition of the Census Bureau and treat as southern states Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.
3See Statistical Abstract of the United States (1970, p.369).
4for the number of candidates which captures the variation in electoral competition
induced by the VRA. We construct the instrument in such a way that the di®erence-
in-di®erence estimations derived in the ¯rst step of the analysis can be interpreted
as ¯rst stage regressions of our instrumental variable estimations. Based on data for
the period 1946-1976, our ¯ndings point to a strong impact of electoral competition
on the stringency of the states' ballot access laws. On average, an additional candi-
date on the ballot has triggered an increase in petition requirements in the order of
7,500 to 10,000 signatures. Again, we perform several robustness checks to validate
our ¯ndings. Taken together, the empirical analysis suggests that the states have
systematically tightened their ballot access laws in reaction to increased levels of elec-
toral competition. Hence, ballot access regulations provide an example of endogenous
political institutions.
The paper is organized as follows. The theoretical model illustrating the behavior of
an incumbent party in setting barriers to entry is presented in Section 2. Section 3
sheds light on the historical background of our empirical analysis in general and the
VRA in particular. The empirical approach and the data are discussed in Section 4.
Section 5 presents our results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Setting optimal barriers to entry
This section provides a simple theoretical framework for the following empirical dis-
cussion. In particular, the model highlights the role of incumbent political parties
which choose optimal barriers to prevent the entry of political competitors.
Consider an economy with political parties competing for power. We focus on the
choice of the `rules of the game' by an incumbent political party, in particular, the
setting of a barrier to entry, B. The barrier a®ects the degree of e®ective competition,
described by the well-behaved function C according to
C = C( ~ C;B); (1)
5where ~ C summarizes exogenous conditions that in°uence C. We call ~ C latent com-
petition. Using subscripts to indicate partial derivatives, let C ~ C > 0 and CB < 0. In
addition, we assume CBB > 0, meaning that increasing the barrier reduces its marginal
impact on C, and CB ~ C < 0, saying that a given increase in B is more e®ective the
more candidates are seeking access to elections.
To capture the idea that incumbent parties usually dislike a situation with strong
electoral competition, we de¯ne a bene¯t function V (C) with VC < 0. However,
setting higher barriers to entry comes at a cost, captured by a cost function K(B)
with KB > 0 and KBB > 0. In practical terms, one may think of negative e®ects
on the incumbent party's general reputation, or of higher political e®ort needed to
implement a more restrictive rule.4 In total, the incumbent party maximizes the
di®erence between the bene¯ts and costs of setting B,
V ¡ K = V (C( ~ C;B)) ¡ K(B): (2)




VCCB ~ C + VCCC ~ CCB
KBB ¡ VCCBB ¡ VCCCBCB
: (3)
As long as the second-order condition holds (i.e. the denominator is positive), the
sign of dB
d ~ C is positive unless VCC is strongly positive. In particular, dB
d ~ C > 0 will
hold if the reduction in utility when competition increases is constant (VCC = 0).
Hence, for a wide range of bene¯t functions, our model predicts a re-design of rules
de¯ning barriers to entry in a way that an increase in latent competition triggers more
restrictive regulations.
In the empirical part of the paper we test for an endogenous adjustment of B, taking
the ballot access restrictions of the U.S. states as an example. This is complicated
by the fact that the exogenous conditions driving the observed degree of electoral
competition are di±cult (if not impossible) to capture. Hence, we lack a convincing
4Ballot access laws have been challenged in court several times. In 1968, for instance, the Supreme
Court declared Ohio's ballot access law unconstitutional, and the state had to reduce the requirements
for third-party and independent candidates considerably.
6empirical counterpart of ~ C. Therefore, our approach to estimate the e®ect of electoral
competition on the stringency of ballot access restrictions rests on the idea to use a
readily observable measure for e®ective competition (such as the number of candi-
dates appearing on the ballot) as the key explanatory variable and to account for the
endogeneity of this measure (i.e. the fact that ~ C itself depends on B) by instrumen-
tal variables. Intuitively, the instruments serve as a substitute for latent competition
as the unobservable explanatory variable of interest. Before turning to the empirical
part, however, we brie°y review some key historical facts our identi¯cation approach
is based upon.
3 Historical Background
Our identi¯cation strategy builds on exogenous variation in state-level electoral compe-
tition that was induced by the abolishment of voting rights regulations in the southern
states in 1965. In the following, we provide a summary of the relevant historical facts.5
Since the 1880s the Democratic Party had established a political quasi-monopoly in
the U.S. South with its representatives often remaining uncontested in elections. This
position was partly built on the e®ective disenfranchisement of black voters. Among
others, black citizens were refused their political rights by all-white Democratic pri-
maries and so-called `Grandfather Clauses' which limited the right to vote to those
individuals whose grandparents had it before the Civil War. Moreover, political par-
ticipation of blacks was obstructed by poll taxes and literacy tests. Though poll taxes
were comparatively low, they discouraged many poor blacks from casting their vote.
Literacy tests were used in an arbitrary manner to discourage black voters from regis-
tering. As a consequence, only a small fraction of black citizens registered for voting.
In 1960 the average registration rate among blacks in the South was only 29.1%, in
contrast to 61.1% among white citizens. In some states, the asymmetry in registration
5For more details, see, e.g., Lawson (1976) and Grofman et al. (1992). Besley et al. (2006) provide
a related description of the historical background.
7rates was even more pronounced. In Mississippi, for example, in 1960 only 5.2% of the
blacks, but 63.9% of the whites were registered.6
The attempts of the black citizens in the southern states to change their lot were largely
unsuccessful for a long period of time. Only after the landmark decision Brownv.Board
of Education by the Supreme Court in 1954, which struck down racial segregation in
public schools, the black reform movements started to gain momentum. The Civil
Rights Movement culminated ten years later in the 1963 'March on Washington' and
Martin Luther King's 'I have a dream' speech. As a response to the growing discom-
fort among black citizens, the Johnson administration decided to support the reform
movement by federal legislation, in particular by the Civil Rights Act (CRA) in 1964
and the Voting Rights Act in 1965. But whereas the black reform movement devel-
oped gradually, the cornerstones of the federal civil rights legislation were enacted in
a quick succession of events. In particular, it seems that the actions taken by the
Johnson administration were largely driven by unforeseen media coverage of a number
of singular events.
One of the unforseen events that triggered legislative activity of the Johnson admin-
istration was the murder of three civil rights activists in Mississippi on June 21, 1964.
The subsequent public outrage made the Republicans join the Northern Democrats
against the Southern Democrats to pass the CRA which president Johnson immedi-
ately signed into law on July 2, 1964. Among other things, the CRA made voting
restrictions in federal elections illegal, but the existing restrictions at the state level
remained in place. It does not seem that the Johnson administration had any inten-
tion to amend the CRA after the 1964 elections.7 Yet, further events, especially the
attack by state troopers on peaceful demonstrators walking from Selma, Alabama, to
the state capital Montgomery on March 7, 1965, received tremendous media attention
and made president Johnson send a proposal for a strict enforcement of voting rights
to Congress on March 17, 1965. The Senate and the House passed the bill at the
beginning of August. On August 6, 1965, president Johnson signed the VRA into law.
6For more details on voter registration in the South between 1960 and 1970, see Statistical Ab-
stract of the United States (1971,p.365).
7See also Besley et al. (2006).
8The VRA ¯nally suspended the use of poll taxes and literacy tests by the states.
Moreover, it authorized federal supervision of voter registration in states, or counties,
where such restrictions had been used in the past and where less than 50% of the voting
age population was registered. Accordingly, the implementation of the prescriptions
of the VRA was very strict and highly e®ective. This stands in contrast to all previous
attempts of federal legislators to abolish the political disenfranchisement of blacks in
the South. Until 1965 these e®orts were largely unsuccessful as the southern Democrats
persistently obstructed any federal initiative addressing the discrimination of blacks.8
Due to the strict enforcement of the VRA, the registration of black voters increased
substantially, and the political landscape of the South was quickly and fundamentally
transformed. As a consequence, the quasi-monopoly of the Democratic Party in the
southern states came to an end. Already in 1966, the ¯rst Republican governors in
the South in the 20th century were elected in Arkansas (W. Rockefeller) and Florida
(C.R. Kirk). Until the mid-seventies, Republicans became governors also in North
Carolina (J.E. Holshouser, 1972), South Carolina (J.B. Edwards, 1974), and Virginia
(L. Holton, 1969).
4 Empirical approach and data
In this section we discuss our identi¯cation strategy regarding the e®ect of electoral
competition on the stringency of ballot access restrictions. We also brie°y review our
data and present summary statistics.
4.1 Estimation approach
Our analysis aims at providing evidence of the e®ect of electoral competition on the
design of ballot access laws in the U.S. The identi¯cation of this e®ect is complicated
8For a detailed account of the long and unsuccessful struggle against voting rights restrictions in
the South see Lawson (1976).
9by the apparent endogeneity of variables that measure the e®ective degree of electoral
competition. To overcome this problem, our estimation strategy exploits variation in
electoral competition which was triggered by the VRA and, therefore, is exogenous to
the states' ballot access regulations. In particular, we make use of the fact that the
VRA considerably increased the overall level of political participation in states with a
relatively high black population share, whereas it left states with relatively few blacks
more or less una®ected.
Before explaining our identi¯cation strategy in detail, let us brie°y discuss the struc-
tural equation of interest which reads
Bit = ®Cit + Xit¯ + µi + ¿t + eit; (4)
where Bit measures the stringency of ballot access restrictions in state i in year t, Cit
is the degree of electoral competition, and Xit denotes a vector of state characteristics
that potentially a®ect the stringency of ballot access requirements. Unobserved state
e®ects and period-speci¯c e®ects are captured by µi and ¿t, while eit denotes a residual.
We use the number of petitions that minor-party and independent candidates need
to submit in order to be placed on the gubernatorial ballot as a measure for B. As
mentioned before, these signature requirements are often substantial and constitute
a signi¯cant barrier to entry for third party and independent candidates. In general,
the variation in the petition requirement is substantial, both across states and over
time.9 Note further that other restrictions like ¯ling fees and tight deadlines during the
application process seem to be less important in practice: ¯ling fees for gubernatorial
candidates are of negligible size in the majority of states, and where they are not,
several Supreme Court rulings require that alternative means for gaining ballot access
have to be speci¯ed. Similarly, due to a number of court decisions, the leeway to adjust
deadlines that have to be met during the application process (like for ¯ling petitions)
is very limited in practice.
With regard to C, we use either the total number of candidates appearing on the
9See Bott (1990) for details on the states' ballot access laws and the following subsection for
descriptive statistics on signature requirements.
10ballot or the number of third-party and independent candidates. At ¯rst glance, the
latter measure seems to be the better choice since it is more closely related to the
stringency of ballot access restrictions for minor-party and independent candidates.
Recall, however, that uncontested gubernatorial races were quite frequent prior to
1965 in the southern states. The signi¯cant increase in electoral competition faced by
the southern Democrats in the aftermath of the VRA was to a considerable extent due
to candidates of the Republican Party regularly appearing on gubernatorial ballots.
This in turn might have triggered adjustments of ballot access requirements in general,
and in particular for minor-party and independent candidates. We therefore use the
total number of candidates as a measure for electoral competition in most estimations
and report results based on the number of third party and independent candidates as
a robustness check.
The prime role of the control variables is to account for a possible e®ect of key eco-
nomic and social-demographic indicators on signature requirements. For instance,
more populous states might choose higher signature requirements. Similarly, it might
be that the leading parties are more likely to face signi¯cant competition in wealthier
and more urbanized states. Therefore, we allow for an independent e®ect of total state
population, per-capita income, educational attainment as well as urbanization.
The coe±cient of interest in our structural equation is ®. It captures the extent to
which states re-design their ballot access requirements in response to changes in the
degree of electoral competition. We expect a positive sign of ®, indicating that states
tend to make access to the ballot more di±cult for third-party and independent can-
didates if major parties face more competition. However, recall from the discussion
of the theoretical model that, because the e®ective degree of electoral competition al-
ready re°ects the impact of B, estimating ® from a naive regression is uninformative.
Technically, the dependence of C on B induces correlation between our main explana-
tory variable and the residual, which renders parameter estimates from simple OLS
regressions inconsistent. Our approach to solve the endogeneity problem is to identify
a source of exogenous variation in electoral competition at the state level and to ex-
ploit this variation in order to derive instrumental variables for C. If the exogenous
11variation captured by the instruments is su±ciently strong, a two-stage least squares
(2SLS) regression will identify the e®ect of interest. Intuitively, the instrumental vari-
ables are used as a substitute for ~ C, the unobservable exogenous variable of interest
in the theoretical model.
Our choice of instruments exploits the extraordinary impact of the VRA on the polit-
ical participation of blacks in the South. To the extent to which the resulting increase
in black voter participation triggered an increase in electoral competition in those
states which were a®ected by the federal legislative initiative, the intervention has the
potential to provide us with variation in the number of candidates that is arguably ex-
ogenous to the states' ballot access requirements. A straightforward way to investigate
the di®erential impact of the abolishment of impediments to black voter participation
is to estimate the impact of the VRA on the number of gubernatorial candidates by
means of a di®erence-in-di®erence approach. In its simplest form, a corresponding
estimation equation looks like
Cit = °Black £ V RAit + ~ Xit± + ~ µi + ~ ¿t + uit; (5)
where Cit again represents the degree of electoral competition, i.e. either the total
number of candidates or just the number of minor-party and independent candidates.
Black £ V RA is the interaction between an indicator for states which were a®ected
by the federal intervention, Black, and a second indicator, VRA, which takes value
zero for all years prior to 1966 and value one for the years starting from 1966 (the
post-shock periods). ~ Xit is a vector of control variables, where the tilde indicates that
the vector is allowed to di®er from the corresponding vector Xit in Equation (4). As
in our main estimation, we also include state e®ects, ~ µi, and period e®ects common to
all states, ~ ¿t.
The purpose of the di®erence-in-di®erence estimations is to check whether (and to
what extent) the VRA increased electoral competition in the subset of a®ected states.
We will therefore focus on the coe±cient of the interaction term, °, which captures
the di®erential impact of the federal intervention. With respect to the de¯nition of
Black, recall that most of the southern states were immediately a®ected by the VRA
12because they were forced to abolish impediments to black voter participation like poll
taxes and literacy tests.10 Note, however, that even in states that did use neither poll
taxes nor literacy tests at the time of the VRA, the political participation of blacks
rose considerably. Florida, for instance, had abolished poll taxes already in 1937 and
did not use formal literacy tests. Notwithstanding, the registration rate of blacks
increased from 39.4% in 1960 to 55.3% in 1970, while the registration rate among
whites decreased from 69.3% to 65.5%.11 In general, the available data on registration
and voting behavior between 1960 and 1970 suggest that the VRA had substantial
e®ects on the political participation of blacks in all states. To account for this, we
use the size of the black minority in order to assign states to treatment and control
group for the di®erence-in-di®erence estimations. In particular, we de¯ne all states
with more than 10% black population in 1960 as Black.12
Equation (5) suggests a straightforward way to derive instruments for the number of
candidates in the main structural equation (4). The di®erence-in-di®erence estimation
identi¯es the e®ect of increased voter participation induced by the VRA on electoral
competition. If the states in the treatment group (those strongly a®ected by the fed-
eral intervention) experienced a signi¯cant increase in electoral competition, we should
¯nd positive and statistically signi¯cant estimates for °, indicating a signi¯cant par-
tial correlation between the interaction term and the degree of electoral competition.
Thus, if ° is found to be statistically di®erent from zero, our di®erence-in-di®erence
estimation procedure would suggest to use Black £ V RA as an instrument for the
endogenous electoral competition measure C in our main structural equation.
Of course, to obtain valid instruments for the degree of electoral competition, we do
not only need to establish that the instruments are correlated with the endogenous ex-
planatory variable, but also that the instruments are truly exogenous to the stringency
10These were Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Virginia and Texas.
11Statistical Abstract of the United States (1971,p.365).
12All our results are robust to moderate changes of this threshold. In particular, we checked
whether the inclusion of states which were close to the 10%-threshold in 1960 into the treatment
group (such as Kentucky with 7.1% blacks, Pennsylvania (7.5%), Missouri (9.0%), Michigan (9.2%),
and Illinois (10.3%)) a®ects the results of the di®erence-in-di®erence as well as the 2SLS estimations.
13of the states' ballot access provisions. As we have argued in the previous section, both
the CRA and the VRA were imposed on the southern states by the federal government.
Moreover, we have pointed out that the enactment and implementation of both acts
was an unprecedented event. In particular, it seems to be highly unlikely that state
policymakers did anticipate the federal intervention they experienced in the course of
the 1964/65 events. Note furthermore that neither the CRA nor the VRA did address
the use of ballot access requirements by the states. It therefore seems to be justi¯ed to
treat the federal legislative intervention of 1964/65 as exogenous to the design of ballot
access rules. Moreover, we account for the fact that ballot access laws in some states
specify an absolute number of signatures, while in others the requirement is given as
a percentage of registered voters or votes cast in the preceding general election. In
states with a relative de¯nition, an increase in turnout (or the number of registered
voters, depending on the speci¯cation of the corresponding state law) will automati-
cally increase the number of petitions required to get access to the ballot in the next
election. To ensure that our instrument can still be validly excluded from the main
estimation equation, we have to account for the direct e®ect of participation by appro-
priate explanatory variables. Therefore, we construct two indicator variables, one for
states with a relative de¯nition of the signature requirement and one for states with
an absolute de¯nition. In our main estimation, we include the interactions of both
indicators with the number of votes cast in the preceding election as additional control
variables. Finally, we also include the indicator for states with a relative de¯nition.
We complete the description of the empirical approach by discussing the choice of the
control variables in the di®erence-in-di®erence regressions which are essentially the
same as in the 2SLS estimations. In particular, we allow for an independent e®ect of
per capita income, educational attainment and urbanization in order to account for the
possibility that an increase in the number of candidates for governor in southern states
might be due to the economic catching-up of the South. For example, higher levels of
educational attainment might induce more citizens to participate in politics, thereby
increasing the number of candidates. Furthermore, we account for the possibility that
more populous states may see more candidates by including state population as an
14additional regressor.
4.2 Data
The cross-sectional dimension of our sample is given by the population of contiguous
U.S. states. Regarding the time dimension, we make use of the gubernatorial election
years between 1946 and 1976. The group of states which are assumed to having
experienced a signi¯cant shock in the overall level of political participation in 1964/65
is de¯ned based on the population share of blacks in 1960, requiring a share of at
least 10 percent. This de¯nition gives a set of 14 states for which the indicator Black
is set to one, consisting of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas
and Virginia. Note that this list includes all southern states according to the de¯nition
of the Census Bureau.
Our measures of electoral competition are based on gubernatorial election outcomes
as reported in ICPSR (1994). The data provide information on each individual can-
didate. Yet, especially for the early years, the assignment of party codes to individual
candidates is imprecise in some cases. This is due to the fact that for some states the
sources ICPSR (1994) is based on did not properly distinguish between minor-party
candidates and write-in candidates. In all such cases, we checked and corrected the
party codes by comparing the respective records in the ICPSR data to the information
on individual candidates in various editions of the handbook on U.S. election statistics
by R.M. Scammon.
The main source for the preparation of data on signature requirements for third-party
and independent candidates in gubernatorial elections were hard copies of the states'
statutes for the whole period 1946-1976. In general, we de¯ne our measure of the
stringency of ballot access restrictions for minor-party and independent candidates
as the number of signatures needed on a petition. In states where the election law
speci¯ed requirements that di®ered between minor party and independent candidates,
15we chose the lower number. In case the number of petition was de¯ned as a percentage
of either the number of votes cast in the last general election or the number of registered
voters, we calculated the implied absolute number of signatures using data on the
number of votes cast from ICPSR (1994) and data on the number of registered voters
from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (various editions). When the number
of registered voters was unavailable for the respective election, we linearly interpolated
using the numbers from the next available years. In a second step, we cross-checked
the numbers obtained from the states' statutes, using the information on petition
requirements in presidential elections in Winger (2006), Appendix F (in most states,
ballot access requirements for presidential and gubernatorial elections are the same)
as well as Bott (1990). In some cases, we were not able to ¯gure out the precise
signature requirement for gubernatorial elections, mostly because the respective state
laws speci¯ed alternative ways to get on the ballot rendering it di±cult to determine
the exact signature requirement.13 Note in particular that we had to exclude the
following states from the analysis altogether: New York, Vermont, Ohio, Washington,
New Jersey, and Wisconsin. For New Jersey, Washington and Wisconsin we had
di±culties in deriving a consistent measure for the signature requirement because the
respective state laws allow for various alternative means to get ballot access. In New
York and Vermont, individual candidates in gubernatorial elections often represent
multiple political parties. Our measure for electoral competition for these states is
thus not comparable to the remaining states. Finally, Ohio's ballot access law was
struck down by the Supreme Court in 1968 as being overly restrictive. Since our
approach aims at identifying endogenous adjustments of ballot access rules, we do not
want to make use of variation which is known to be driven by exogenous forces.
The data on state characteristics that serve as control variables come from the Bureau
of the Census. They include total state population, per capita income (de°ated to
1960 dollars), educational attainment (percentage of total population 25 years and
over with a high school diploma or a higher degree), and urbanization (percentage of
13For instance, some state laws o®er minor parties the opportunity to hold a party convention
with a certain minimum number of attendees that can nominate a candidate whose name will then
appear on the ballot.
16Table 1: Petition requirements for minor-party and independent candidates, 1946-1976
Period Nob Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
1946-1976 410 8476 16034 0 103208
1946-1956 170 5477 11388 0 57306
1958-1966 135 9254 16987 0 74223
1968-1976 105 12329 19951 0 103208
Samples comprise states in gubernatorial election years in the respective period. Sources: Revised State Codes (various
years) and Winger (2006).
Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Total # of candidates 2.72 1.20 1 9
# of minor-party & independent cand's 0.749 1.15 0 7
Vote castt¡1 (1000's) 905 1067 40.7 6510
Signature requirement relative 0.368 0.483 0 1
Black 0.298 0.458 0 1
VRA 0.326 0.469 0 1
Black£VRA 0.110 0.313 0 1
Total population (1000's) 3111 3215 143 21173
Per capita income (in dollars of 1960) 6228 1767 2701 11360
Educational attainment 42.7 11.0 18.9 74.9
Sample comprises states in gubernatorial election years, 1946-1976 (Nob=410). Sources: ICPSR (1994) and Statistical
Abstract of the United States (various years). Total # of candidates, # of minor-party and independent candidates
and vote cast for general elections only. `Black' is an indicator for states with a population share of blacks higher
than 10% in 1960. VRA is an indicator for post-VRA periods, i.e. 1966-1976. Educational attainment is share of total
population 25 years and over with a high school diploma or a higher degree. Urbanization is share of urban population
as de¯ned by the Census Bureau.
urban population as de¯ned by the Census Bureau).
Table 1 entails summary statistics for petition requirements as speci¯ed in the re-
spective state election laws. We note that there is substantial variation in signature
requirements both across states and across time. While in the period 1946-1956 the
average number of signatures required to put a non-major party candidate on a gu-
bernatorial ballot was about 5,500, that number more than doubled to reach more
than 12,000 in the period 1968-1976. In addition, the standard variation increased
considerably.
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the explanatory variables in our main structural
equation. Our key explanatory variables are shown in the ¯rst two rows. Note in par-
ticular that minor-party and independent candidates appear on gubernatorial ballots
quite frequently.
17Table 3: E®ect of VRA on electoral competition, di®erence-in-di®erence estimations
Dependent variable: Number of candidates in gubernatorial elections,
all parties minor parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Black£VRA 0.591?? 0.583?? 0.597?? 0.518?? 0.538??
(0.235) (0.219) (0.241) (0.216) (0.233)
VRA 0.312?? - - - -
(0.117)
Population - - 0.00007 ?? - 0.00006?
(0.00003) (0.00003)
Per-capita income - - -0.0002 - -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Educational attainment - - 0.059 - 0.043
(0.080) (0.074)
Urbanization - - 0.014 - 0.011
(0.016) (0.016)
Year e®ects no yes yes yes yes
State e®ects yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.49 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.55
Sample includes gubernatorial elections from 1946 to 1976 (429 observations), see text for details. Standard errors
(robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation) in parentheses. `Black' is an indicator for states with a black
population share exceeding 10% in 1960. `VRA' is an indicator for elections taking place after the VRA, i.e. 1966-1976.
Signi¯cance levels: ?? 5%; ? 10%.
5 Results
5.1 The e®ect of the VRA on electoral competition
Before we turn to our main results, we will ¯rst discuss the results of the di®erence-
in-di®erence estimations regarding the impact of the VRA on electoral competition.
The ¯rst set of results is displayed in Table 3. Column (1) shows the treatment e®ect
for a baseline speci¯cation that accounts only for state e®ects and the indicator for
post-shock years, V RA, as additional explanatory variables. Relative to the states in
the control group, the e®ect of the VRA on the number of candidates in the states
with a signi¯cant black minority is estimated to be about 0.6. Column (2) depicts the
results if we account for a full set of year e®ects instead of V RA. The coe±cient of
the treatment e®ect is virtually unchanged and still signi¯cant at the 5% level. To
account for an independent e®ect of state characteristics which might be related to the
number of candidates in gubernatorial elections, Column (3) reports a speci¯cation
18that includes total state population, per-capita income, educational attainment, and
urbanization as additional explanatory variables. Among the control variables, only
population proves to be signi¯cant. The coe±cient indicates that if the population
grows by 1 million, the number of candidates increases by 0.07. More importantly, the
estimated e®ect of the VRA on the number of candidates is una®ected by the inclusion
of the additional control variables and still signi¯cant at the 5% level.
Further evidence for the e®ect of the VRA on electoral competition is provided in
Columns (4) and (5). Here, we have de¯ned the dependent variable as the number of
minor-party and independent candidates as opposed to the total number of candidates
in the previous regressions. As expected, switching to this narrower de¯nition does
not have any sweeping e®ect on our estimates. The somewhat smaller point estimates
for the treatment e®ect just re°ect that part of the increase in electoral competition
in the southern states after the VRA was due to candidates of the Republican Party
now regularly appearing on gubernatorial ballots. To summarize, Table 3 con¯rms a
strong e®ect of the VRA on the number of candidates in gubernatorial elections.
5.2 The e®ect of electoral competition on the design of ballot access
Let us now turn to the impact of electoral competition on the stringency of the states'
ballot access requirements, i.e. the number of signatures required for minor-party and
independent candidates to be placed on the ballot in gubernatorial elections. As
discussed in the previous section, we identify this competition e®ect by means of 2SLS
estimations accounting for unobserved heterogeneity at the state level. Drawing on
the strong partial correlation between the interaction term Black £ V RA and the
number of candidates identi¯ed by the series of di®erence-in-di®erence estimations
shown above, we use Black £ V RA as an instrument for electoral competition.
As before, Table 4 reports estimated coe±cients along with standard errors which
are robust to both heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. While we use the same
set of states as in the di®erence-in-di®erence estimations shown above, we now have
19Table 4: E®ect of electoral competition on stringency of signature requirements, IV estimations
Dep. variable: Signature requirement for minor-party and independent cand.'s in gub. elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total number of candidates 9316 ?? 8774?? 9408?? 9812?? 9343??
(4327) (4081) (4369) (4688) (4468)
Vote castt¡1£ 13.9??? 13.4??? 14.1??? 14.4??? 14.0???
signature requirement relative (5.29) (4.91) (5.39) (5.49) (5.23)
Vote castt¡1£ -0.401 -0.104 -0.405 -0.160 0.067
signature requirement absolute (5.93) (5.80) (5.95) (6.00) (5.86)
Signature requirement relative 22093 ?? 22142?? 22115?? 22183?? 22245??
(9074) (9013) (9079) (9167) (9090)
Population 0.227 -0.172 0.228 0.405 -0.007
(1.56) (1.42) (1.56) (1.57) (1.42)
Population squared -0.00008 -0.00006 -0.00008 -0.00009 -0.00007
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Per-capita income - 2.55 - - 2.42
(2.07) (2.20)
Educational attainment - - 110 - 171
(718) (719)
Urbanization - - - -153 -123
(186) (183)
Year e®ects yes yes yes yes yes
State e®ects yes yes yes yes yes
F-Statistic 1st stage 10.28 10.51 11.91 8.39 9.78
Sample includes gubernatorial elections from 1946 to 1976 (410 observations). Standard errors (robust to heteroscedas-
ticity and serial correlation) in parentheses. Educational attainment and urbanization measured in percent. `Signature
requirement relative' is an indicator for states with a signature requirement de¯ned as a percentage of either the number
of votes or the number of registered voters in the preceding election. `Signature requirement absolute' is an indicator for
states with an absolute de¯nition of the signature requirement. Instrument for number of candidates is Black £ V RA.
Signi¯cance levels: ??? 1%; ?? 5%; ? 10%.
only 410 observations (compared to 429 before). The reason is missing information
on signature requirements for some state/year cells as mentioned before. Column (1)
reports a baseline speci¯cation of our structural equation that accounts for the impact
of electoral competition along with the gubernatorial vote cast of the preceding elec-
tion, split into two separate e®ects depending on whether the petition requirement is
de¯ned relative or absolute, the indicator for states with a relative de¯nition, state
population and state population squared. The estimated coe±cient of the total num-
ber of candidates points to a strong impact of electoral competition on the stringency
of petition requirements. Our estimates suggest that an additional candidate in gu-
bernatorial elections triggers an increase in the number of required signatures by more
than 9,300. The F-statistic measuring the predictive power of the excluded instrument
20in the ¯rst-stage regression attains a value of 10.3, somewhat above the rule-of-thumb
threshold value of 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) to avoid the problem of
weak instruments.14 Recall that we use an instrument with is characterized by very
limited variation: Black £ V RA switches only once from zero to one for a subset of
states and is constant and equal to zero for all others. Given that our identi¯cation
strategy is extremely parsimonious in terms of the variation that is added to the system
by the inclusion of the instrument, the performance of Black £V RA in the ¯rst-stage
regression is remarkable. Note also that using the interaction term as the instrumental
variable ensures that the di®erence-in-di®erence estimations discussed before are very
similar to the actual ¯rst-stage regressions of our 2SLS approach.
The results also show that some variation in the signature requirement is explained
by participation. As expected, however, participation is systematically related to the
number of petitions only in states with a relative de¯nition of ballot access require-
ments. On average, an increase in participation by 1,000 additional votes (holding
population ¯xed) increases the petition requirement by about 14 signatures in the
respective states. Furthermore, we also ¯nd that states with a relative de¯nition of
ballot access requirements are characterized by signi¯cantly higher barriers to the en-
try of minor-party and independent candidates. Evaluated at the sample mean of
Vote castt¡1, these states require about 34,700 signatures more than states with an
absolute de¯nition. This regularity is con¯rmed throughout our analysis and stems
from the fact that most states with an absolute de¯nition demand around 500 to 10,000
signatures, whereas even moderately populous states with a rule requiring one or two
percent of the vote cast in the preceding election tend to have signi¯cantly stricter
e®ective requirements.
Columns (2) to (4) each add one of the additional control variables, without substan-
tially a®ecting the results. The estimated coe±cients of the number of candidates
range from 8,800 to 9,800 and are all signi¯cant at the 5% level. The coe±cients of
the remaining control variables are also robust to the changes in speci¯cation. Fi-
14Note that with a single instrument our model is exactly identi¯ed and we therefore cannot run
formal weak identi¯cation tests according to Stock and Yogo (2005).
21nally, Column (5) reports an estimation that includes all our control variables. The
results almost duplicate the outcome from Column (1). Taken together, the inclusion
of additional controls does not seem to have any signi¯cant e®ect on our main result.
5.3 Robustness
As discussed above, the instrument used to identify the e®ect of electoral competition
is extremely parsimonious as it captures only variation in electoral competition which
comes from the e®ect of the VRA on states with a strong black minority. There
are three southern states, however, which did abolish poll taxes as one important
restriction to black voter participation already before 1965/66: South Carolina (1951),
Tennessee (1951), and Arkansas (1964).15 We therefore suspect that the design of
our instrument, Black £ V RA, is suboptimal in terms of its predictive power in the
¯rst-stage regression. To exploit the variation induced by the abolishment of poll
taxes prior to 1966, we construct a second IV from the interaction of an indicator for
the existence of poll taxes, Polltax, with an indicator for South Carolina, Tennessee,
and Arkansas, Early Abolish. By construction, our second IV accounts only for the
variation in electoral competition that enters through the deviation of South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Arkansas from the remaining southern states in terms of the timing of
the abolishment of voting restrictions.
Table 5 reports the results of a series of 2SLS estimations using both Black £ V RA
and Polltax £ Early Abolish as IVs. A quick inspection of the results reveals that
the estimates for the e®ect of electoral competition on the stringency of the states'
ballot access laws are now slightly higher, ranging from about 9,000 to 10,100. At
the same time, the point estimates are more precise: across all ¯ve speci¯cations,
the e®ect is estimated to be di®erent from zero at the 3% level of signi¯cance. Note
also that the ¯ndings regarding the control variables are virtually identical to those
15Literacy tests were not abolished prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1965, i.e. all states with this
kind of barrier to black voter participation were forced to remove the restriction immediately after
the CRA. See also Ogden (1958) and Husted and Kenny (1997).
22Table 5: IV estimations using re¯ned instruments
Dep. variable: Signature requirement for minor-party and independent cand.'s in gub. elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total number of candidates 9567 ?? 9044?? 9671?? 10090?? 9660??
(4125) (3872) (4143) (4575) (4293)
Vote castt¡1£ 14.0??? 13.5??? 14.1??? 14.6??? 14.2???
signature requirement relative (5.21) (4.85) (5.31) (5.44) (5.17)
Vote castt¡1£ -0.560 -0.276 -0.574 -0.308 -0.102
signature requirement absolute (6.10) (5.94) (6.12) (6.16) (6.01)
Signature requirement relative 22080 ?? 22129?? 22100?? 22175?? 22236??
(9091) (9022) (9101) (9175) (9094)
Population 0.237 -0.166 0.239 0.424 0.011
(1.55) (1.42) (1.55) (1.56) (1.41)
Population squared -0.00008 -0.00006 -0.00008 -0.0001 -0.00007
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Per-capita income - 2.58 - - 2.44
(2.11) (2.25)
Educational attainment - - 104 - 170
(734) (736)
Urbanization - - - -161 -132
(188) (184)
Year e®ects yes yes yes yes yes
State e®ects yes yes yes yes yes
F-Statistic 1st stage 6.51 6.41 6.80 5.32 5.22
Hansen test (p-value) 0.82 0.78 0.82 0.80 0.76
Sample includes gubernatorial elections from 1946 to 1976 (410 observations). Standard errors (robust to heteroscedas-
ticity and serial correlation) in parentheses. Educational attainment and urbanization measured in percent. `Signature
requirement relative' is an indicator for states with a signature requirement de¯ned as a percentage of either the number
of votes or the number of registered voters in the preceding election. `Signature requirement absolute' is an indicator for
states with an absolute de¯nition of the signature requirement. Instruments for number of candidates are Black £V RA
and Polltax£Early Abolish. See text for details. Signi¯cance levels: ??? 1%; ?? 5%; ? 10%.
in Table 4. With two IVs for one endogenous explanatory variable, we can now also
test the overidentifying restriction. The Table reports p-values for the Hansen test,
indicating for all speci¯cations that the overidentifying restriction is not rejected at
any reasonable level.
To describe the degree of electoral competition, we have so far used the total number of
candidates appearing on the ballot. As discussed above, one might argue that the total
number of candidates is not a suitable measure for electoral competition in a regression
with the stringency of ballot access requirements for minor-party and independent
candidates as the dependent variable. Therefore, we repeat all estimations from Table
5 using an alternative measure of electoral competition which excludes all major party
23Table 6: IV estimations, major party candidates excluded from competition measure
Dep. variable: Signature requirement for minor-party and independent cand.'s in gub. elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# of minor-party & independent cand's 10229 ?? 9641?? 10501?? 10801?? 10475??
(4650) (4254) (4821) (5161) (4891)
Vote castt¡1£ 14.9?? 14.3?? 15.2?? 15.5?? 15.2??
signature requirement relative (6.16) (5.68) (6.44) (6.41) (6.20)
Vote castt¡1£ -0.980 -0.661 -1.01 -0.795 -0.548
signature requirement absolute (6.79) (6.55) (6.84) (6.90) (6.69)
Signature requirement relative 21105 ?? 21214?? 21135?? 21137?? 21274??
(10024) (9880) (10007) (10155) (9973)
Population 0.061 -0.383 0.060 0.228 -0.225
(1.67) (1.51) (1.65) (1.67) (1.50)
Population squared -0.00008 -0.00005 -0.00008 -0.00009 -0.00007
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Per-capita income - 2.92 - - 2.81
(2.28) (2.44)
Educational attainment - - 286 - 347
(735) (726)
Urbanization - - - -151 -129
(198) (194)
Year e®ects yes yes yes yes yes
State e®ects yes yes yes yes yes
F-Statistic 1st stage 5.66 5.68 5.61 4.63 4.34
Hansen test (p-value) 0.97 0.92 0.96 0.95 0.91
Sample includes gubernatorial elections from 1946 to 1976 (410 observations). Standard errors (robust to heteroscedas-
ticity and serial correlation) in parentheses. Educational attainment and urbanization measured in percent. `Signature
requirement relative' is an indicator for states with a signature requirement de¯ned as a percentage of either the number
of votes or the number of registered voters in the preceding election. `Signature requirement absolute' is an indicator for
states with an absolute de¯nition of the signature requirement. Instruments for number of candidates are Black £V RA
and Polltax£Early Abolish. See text for details. Signi¯cance levels: ?? 5%; ? 10%.
candidates. As Table 6 indicates, our results are highly robust to this change in
the de¯nition of electoral competition. An additional candidate is found to trigger a
tightening of the petition requirement by 9,600 to 10,800 signatures. As before, the
coe±cient of interest remains signi¯cant at the 5% level across all estimations.
So far our identi¯cation relies on a single explanatory variable in order to account
for the direct e®ect of participation on the stringency of signature requirements in
states with relatively de¯ned ballot access requirements. Of course, the respective
coe±cient can only capture the average of the changes in the dependent variable that
are directly related to changes in participation. One might be worried that this way
of controlling for the impact of relative de¯nitions of signature requirements does
24not account for di®erences in actual regulations within the group of states with such
relative rules. To the extent that part of the e®ective variation in B comes from
imperfectly controlled changes in participation, one might still question the validity of
the exclusion restriction with respect to our instruments. To cope with this problem,
we construct an alternative measure of the petition requirement for states with a
relative de¯nition that eliminates all variation that might be driven by participation.
This is done by computing the e®ective number of petitions demanded when a state
with a relative de¯nition changes its percent-requirement and keeping this number
in all following election years until the state actually changes the underlying rule.
Thereafter, the new level is kept until the law is changed again, and so on. With the
resulting adjusted series for the signature requirement, participation should lose its
explanatory power even for the states where ballot access is de¯ned in relative terms.
As Table 7 reports, the estimations based on the adjusted signature requirements do
not alter our results in any signi¯cant way. However, the coe±cient of interest is now
estimated to be somewhat smaller. This might indicate that the previous approach
slightly overstated the e®ect of electoral competition on the stringency of petition
requirements. Yet, even with the adjusted signature series, an additional candidate is
still estimated to trigger an increase in the barrier of about 7,600 to 9,000 petitions.
Our conclusion regarding the strategic behavior of state policymakers when designing
of the underlying state rules is thus con¯rmed. At the same time, the signi¯cance
of the e®ect of interest remains at the 5% level for three out of four speci¯cations.
Furthermore, the vote cast in the preceding election is no longer signi¯cant. This is
in line with our expectations, as the adjustment of the signature series ensures that
the variation comes only from real changes in the underlying state regulations and is,
therefore, not related to participation.
To summarize, our results reveal that an important institution governing the degree
of electoral competition and minority representation in the U.S., namely petition re-
quirements for third-party and independent candidates, is endogenously determined.
In fact, the evidence reported here suggests that state policy makers have been actively
engaged in re-designing ballot access regulations. The impact of electoral competition
25Table 7: IV estimations using adjusted dependent variable
Dependent variable: Adjusted signature requirements in gubernatorial elections
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total # of candidates 7629 ?? 8184?? - -
(3853) (3924)
# of minor-party & independent cand's - - 8365 ? 9037??
(4465) (4517)
Vote castt¡1£ 5.85 6.15 6.72 7.12
signature requirement relative (4.61) (4.78) (5.54) (5.68)
Vote castt¡1£ -2.78 -3.08 -3.18 -3.54
signature requirement absolute (5.02) (5.19) (5.44) (5.78)
Signature requirement relative 21774 ??? 21759??? 21004??? 20924??
(8039 ) (8035) (8642 ) (8783)
Population 0.961 0.993 0.777 0.797
(1.28) (1.28) (1.32) (1.33)
Population squared -0.00014 -0.00014 -0.00013 -0.00014
(0.00009) (0.00009) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Per-capita income 2.32 2.36 2.63 2.69
1.93 (2.01) 2.09 (2.20)
Educational attainment 374 372 515 525
625 652 (624) (647)
Urbanization -116 -132 -117 -134
181 188 192 (199)
Year e®ects yes yes yes yes
State e®ects yes yes yes yes
Black £ V RA yes yes yes yes IV's:
Polltax £ Early Abolish no yes no yes
F-Statistic 1st stage 9.78 5.22 7.97 4.34
Hansen test (p-value) - 0.53 - 0.68
Sample includes gubernatorial elections from 1946 to 1976 (410 observations). Standard errors (robust to heteroscedas-
ticity and serial correlation) in parentheses. Educational attainment and urbanization measured in percent. `Signature
requirement relative' is an indicator for states with a signature requirement de¯ned as a percentage of either the number
of votes or the number of registered voters in the preceding election. `Signature requirement absolute' is an indicator
for states with an absolute de¯nition of the signature requirement. Regarding IVs, see text for details. Signi¯cance
levels: ?? 5%; ? 10%.
on the design of ballot access rules is strong, and the direction is as expected: the
more minor-party and independent candidates appear on the ballot, the more restric-
tive are, on average, the requirements to get ballot access. Based on the evidence
reported here, it appears that the major parties have consistently used their power to
frame political institutions in a way that protects their position as incumbents in a
setting of duopolistic political competition.
266 Conclusion
This paper starts from the question to what extent political institutions can be re-
garded as exogenous constraints on political agents. To shed light on this issue, we
have examined the design of state ballot access laws in the U.S. from the post-war
period to the mid-seventies. Our results suggest that state policymakers have system-
atically reacted to increased electoral competition by raising the petition requirements
that have to be met in order to get access to the ballot in gubernatorial elections.
Our ¯ndings thus relate to the evidence reported by Trebbi et al. (2007) on the re-
design of electoral rules in cities in the U.S. South in reaction to the increased political
participation of blacks in the aftermath of the federal Voting Rights Act.
Our identi¯cation strategy rests on the idea that the Voting Rights Act has induced
variation in electoral competition which is exogenous to the states' ballot access regu-
lations. As a ¯rst step of our empirical approach, we have shown that the abolishment
of limitations to black voter participation such as poll taxes and literacy tests has in-
deed signi¯cantly raised the number of candidates in gubernatorial elections. We have
then provided evidence on the link between electoral competition and the stringency
of ballot access restrictions. To overcome the endogeneity problem, we have used in-
strumental variables which capture the exogenous variation in electoral competition
induced by the Voting Rights Act. Across various speci¯cations, the increase in peti-
tion requirements triggered by an increase in electoral competition by one additional
gubernatorial candidate is estimated to be in the order of 7,600 to 10,800 signatures.
Our results suggest that the endogenous adjustment of state laws governing the ac-
cess of third-party and independent candidates to general elections has a depressing
e®ect on actual levels of electoral competition. This may have far-reaching conse-
quences, as electoral competition seems to positively a®ect the quality of governance
and economic performance. Besley et al. (2006), for instance, claim that the increase
in political competition induced by the Voting Rights Act raised long-run per capita
income considerably. Together with their ¯ndings, our results suggest that the e®ort
27of state policymakers to dampen the increase in electoral competition by re-designing
the political institutions under their control may have signi¯cant welfare costs.
However, a caveat is warranted regarding this interpretation. Lizzeri and Persico
(2005), for instance, point to potential drawbacks of electoral competition, arguing
that competition induces parties to focus on the interests of a narrower constituency.
This in turn may lead to a stronger in°uence of special interests in politics implying
substantial e±ciency losses. Under this view the observed adjustment of petition
requirements could also be viewed as a socially optimal response to a rising level
of electoral competition. In our perspective, however, this rationale for limiting the
number of active political parties is unlikely to be valid in the context of the U.S.,
where the majoritarian voting system already ensures the existence of two dominating
political parties. Overall, it is hard to believe that the design of ballot access laws in
U.S. states is socially optimal, in particular with regard to the southern states and
their pronounced tradition of political marginalization of large groups of voters.
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